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1.   Introduction
To value a controlling block of shares 
on the equity of a corporation 
requires measurement of three main 
components.1 First, a controlling block 
holder may add value by monitoring 
management or effectively managing 
the firm. We call this component the 
shared security benefits because 
they accrue simultaneously to all 
the shareholders of the corporation. 
Second, a controlling shareholder may 
extract private benefits of control. We 
think of these private benefits primarily 
as the social status and social network 
access for individual block holders, or as 
the economic synergies for corporate 
block holders that come with owning 
a large equity stake on a corporation. 
Shared and private benefits give rise 
to what is called a control or significant 
influence premium. Third, a large 
shareholder faces an illiquidity cost 
associated with the difficulty of selling 
a large equity stake. Such large stakes 
are traded through private negotiations 
and often at a discount with respect to 
prices at which dispersed shareholders 
trade shares of the same company in 
more liquid, public stock markets. These 
illiquidity costs give rise to what is called 
a marketability discount. 
To illustrate the illiquidity costs consider 
Panasonic’s acquisition of 70 percent 
of Sanyo’s equity, on a fully diluted 
basis, from Mitsui-Sumitomo Bank, 
Daiwa SMBC and Goldman Sachs  
(see Kruse and Suzuki, 2009, for 
details). On 7 November 2008, 
Panasonic announced that it was in talks 
to acquire a majority stake in Sanyo. On 
that day, Sanyo’s share price jumped 
from JPY145 to JPY204 (the price had 
been JPY114 on 27 October 2008). 
Later, on 24 November 2008, Panasonic 
made an offer of JPY120 per share. The 
three banks rejected the offer, stating 
that the price was too low. Goldman 
Sachs added that the price per share 
should be at least JPY200 in order to 
reflect the control premium. Panasonic 
raised its bid price on 3 December 
2008, to JPY130 per share, and the two 
Japanese banks accepted the offer. 
Goldman Sachs still rejected it and 
even suggested that it might purchase 
the Japanese banks’ stakes. But on 
16 December 2008, and following the 
demise of Lehman Brothers, Goldman 
Sachs announced its first-ever quarterly 
loss since going public in 1999. Shortly 
after, on 19 December 2008, Goldman 
Sachs accepted a price of JPY131, i.e., 
a discount of almost 10 percent to the 
pre-announcement price, while Sanyo’s 
shares in the market dropped to  
JPY136. This example illustrates several 
important features about illiquidity 
costs: (i) that finding a buyer that can 
increase shareholder value following a 
take over is difficult; (ii) that unexpected 
events may occur, forcing a block holder 
to sell immediately, even when the block 
holder is a large financial institution; and, 
(iii) that the block may have to be sold at 
a discount relative to the share price in 
the public market following such events. 
To the best of our knowledge, there 
are no estimates of the marketability 
discount that consider these illiquidity 
costs.2 This glaring lack of estimates 
is surprising for two reasons. First, 
the need to price these dimensions of 
illiquidity is not new. In the famous case 
of Mandelbaum et al. v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue (1995), the court 
points to the limited evidence on the 
proper size of the discount on the 
value of large blocks relative to the 
value of exchange traded shares. In a 
job aid for IRS valuation professionals 
dated 2009, the Internal Revenue 
Service acknowledges the difficulty 
in assessing the lack of marketability: 
“[…] the establishment of a Discount 
for Lack of Marketability is a factually 
intensive endeavor that is heavily 
dependent upon the experience and 
capability of the valuator.” Second, 
the predominance of high ownership 
concentration as a form of corporate 
governance is by now well established. 
High ownership concentration is a 
pervasive phenomenon in public 
corporations in many countries, 
including the United States;3 it is 
also, an integral part of privately held 
corporations where lack of marketability 
may be particularly severe. 
1  The results in this article are based on a sample of sales of blocks of 35 percent or more of the total equity of a 
corporation on a fully diluted basis. Several studies in the literature use weaker definitions of controlling blocks, 
requiring as little as 5 percent to 10 percent. Our use of a conservative definition of control follows Albuquerque 
and Schroth (2010), who show that the pricing of small controlling blocks is complicated by the availability 
of more alternative trading strategies. However, our estimation method isolates the marketability discount 
component from the effects of block size, implying that our estimates of the marketability discount are also 
applicable to smaller controlling blocks.
2  In contrast there is a large literature that provides techniques to value shared security benefits, e.g. discounted 
cash flow or multiples analyses. Valuing shared security benefits is well understood and is not the subject of 
this paper.
3  Using a sample of large US corporations, Dlugosz et al. (2006) find that 75 percent of all firm-year observations 
have block holders that own at least 10 percent of the firms’ equity. Using a sample of US firms in 1995, 
Holderness (2009) provides evidence that 96 percent of US public firms have block holders and that 
the average (median) ownership by the largest shareholder is 26 percent (17 percent). More recent and 
comprehensive evidence of the concentration of ownership in corporate America is unavailable. See Morck 
(2007) for extensive evidence outside the United States.
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The goal of this paper is to show how to 
obtain an estimate of the marketability 
discount and to apply this estimate 
to the valuation of a controlling block 
of shares. To do so, we identify some 
of the main cross-sectional and time-
series determinants of the marketability 
discount for publicly traded firms. 
We then illustrate how to apply a 
marketability discount adjustment 
to controlling blocks of both publicly 
traded firms and privately held firms, 
using as an example the Mandelbaum 
valuation case.4 
To identify its determinants, we use 
the marketability discount estimates in 
Albuquerque and Schroth (forthcoming, 
henceforth AS). AS provide a model of 
the trading and pricing of a controlling 
block of shares and are able to identify 
the three components of block value, i.e., 
shared security benefits, private benefits 
of control and marketability discount, 
from data on the block premium and 
abnormal returns in a cross-section of 
block trades between 1990 and 2010. 
The main focus of this paper is on the 
measurement of the marketability 
discount on a case-by-case basis. We 
do not discuss here the measurement 
of the other two components of block 
value because this step requires the use 
of standard equity valuation techniques, 
i.e., for the value of shared security 
benefits, or the imputation of the 
idiosyncratic private benefits of the block 
holder. However, a valuer should assess 
whether such factors are reflected in a 
valuation of a large stake in a company. 
These two additional valuation effects, 
in contrast with the marketability 
discount, are generally viewed to 
contribute to higher valuations and 
they must be considered in connection 
with the marketability discount when 
determining the total value of a large 
or controlling interest.
Section 2 presents briefly the traditional 
approaches to measure the illiquidity of 
shares, underscoring their inapplicability 
to the case of controlling blocks. Section 3 
reviews the pricing model in AS, providing 
an intuitive explanation of how the model 
is able to decompose observed block 
prices into the three components of 
block valuation. Section 4 presents the 
actual estimates of the marketability 
discount in AS and describes the data 
set used to identify their cross-sectional 
and time-series determinants. Section 5 
presents our results and shows how to 
use them with a specific application to the 
Mandelbaum case. Section 6 concludes.
4  We believe that our valuation framework has several applications to pricing, e.g., for tax purposes or asset 
sales, among others, but we also acknowledge that it is of limited use for financial reporting. For the purpose 
of comparables reporting, FAS 157 and IFRS 13 prohibit the use of block discounts in financial reporting when 
individual shares of the company are traded in an active market. Also, fair value may require longer marketing 
periods that may not be consistent with the need to absorb a sudden liquidity shock.
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2.   Literature review
2.1 Measures of the value 
of control
There is a vast literature that tries to 
measure the value of control. One 
approach is to use the voting premium, 
measured directly as the difference 
in prices across shares with different 
voting rights (e.g., Masulis et al., 2009), 
or indirectly, as deviations from put-call 
parity (Kalay et al., 2011) and equity-loan 
values (Christoffersen et al., 2007). This 
approach features two main drawbacks. 
First, by studying prices per share, it 
measures the marginal value of control. 
Instead, we are interested in the total 
value of control, which is the aim of 
any valuation analysis of controlling 
blocks. Second, these measures rely on 
prices of exchange traded shares and, 
therefore, cannot be used to estimate 
the marketability discount in block 
shares. Finally, these measures only 
capture the net value of control, i.e., the 
difference between the benefits and the 
costs of control, without isolating each 
component. The method we describe 
below uses a direct measure of the 
liquidity costs arising from the lack of 
marketability of a block, which are of 
first order importance for companies 
with controlling blocks.
Another strand of the literature, which 
started with Barclay and Holderness 
(1989), measures the value of control via 
the block premium, i.e., the difference 
between the negotiated price per 
share in the block and the price of the 
exchange traded shares. As we argue 
Figure 1: Scatter plot of the Block Premium against the 
Marketability Discount
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in our prior work (Albuquerque and 
Schroth, 2010), the block premium 
summarizes different dimensions of 
benefits and costs of control. Therefore, 
while informative, the block premium 
is neither a direct measure of the 
benefits nor of the costs of control. 
Not surprisingly, we find a very low 
unconditional correlation between the 
block premium and the marketability 
discount measure we use here 
(see Figure 1). 
2.2 Other valuation 
approaches to illiquid 
assets
There is a related literature that 
studies the pricing of illiquid assets 
(see Longstaff, 1995, Abudy and 
Benninga, 2011, and the surveys by 
Amihud et al., 2005, and Damadoran, 
2005). This literature measures the 
marketability discount associated 
with stocks with trading restrictions, 
such as the vesting of stock grants. 
Our analysis differs from these papers 
in two critical ways. First, we study 
the pricing of shares belonging to 
large blocks, which differs from the 
pricing of a single share because of the 
control premium, among other things. 
Second, we consider a different reason 
for illiquidity: the intrinsic scarcity of 
controlling stakes for specific firms. 
Indeed, we consider illiquidity costs that 
arise because block holders bear the risk 
of selling in unexpectedly low demand 
periods and due to unexpected personal 
liquidity shortages. These frictions are 
more relevant than trading restrictions 
imposed, say, on management or 
employees. 
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3.   The Albuquerque and Schroth model
In this section, we review the AS block 
valuation study. Instead of providing 
the full mathematical formulation of 
the model, we provide an intuitive 
description of how the model is used to 
identify, or estimate from the data the 
various components of block value.
The AS model specifies the block value 
as a function of three components. First, 
the model assumes that a controlling 
block holder affects the firm’s cash flow 
(e.g., Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; 
Barclay and Holderness, 1989; and 
Pérez-González, 2004) and is therefore 
able to add value to all shareholders. 
Second, the model allows for pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary private benefits of 
control, as long as these are not diverted 
from the firm’s cash flow.5 These are 
assumed to be positively correlated 
with the asset value generated by the 
controlling shareholder and do not lead 
to an additional trading motive. Finally, 
the model allows for illiquidity costs 
and, therefore, a marketability discount. 
In brief:
Value of block =  Present value of cash 
flows under block holder 
+ Present value of private 
benefits to block holder 
– Illiquidity costs
AS show that their model can identify 
these three components by using the 
valuations of two different types of 
shareholders during a block trade: the 
block holders’ valuation implicit in the 
negotiated block price and the dispersed 
shareholders’ valuation revealed in the 
exchange share price. This information 
is summarized respectively in the 
block premium paid by the acquirer, 
i.e., the price paid per share in the 
block normalized by the exchange-
traded-share price prior to the trade 
announcement, and in the cumulative 
(abnormal) announcement return on 
the exchange-traded shares, i.e., the 
price change on the exchange-traded 
shares from before to after the trade 
announcement. 
3.1 Changes in security 
benefits
The model uses the announcement 
return on the exchange-traded shares to 
identify the change in security benefits 
from one block holder (the seller) to 
another (the buyer). A positive return 
implies that the dispersed shareholders 
perceive the new block holder to be 
better at running the firm. Vice-versa, 
a negative return implies that the 
dispersed shareholders perceive the 
new block holder to be worse at running 
the firm. There are two reasons why a 
trade causing a negative announcement 
return may occur. First, the block buyer 
may derive sufficient private benefits 
despite reducing cash flow, thus paying 
a high price for the block and enticing 
the current block holder to sell. Second, 
the block seller may have been hit by a 
liquidity shock that forces the sale. We 
address these two pricing effects below.
3.2 Private benefits
Trades that are accompanied by low 
or negative announcement returns 
but have a positive block premium are 
likely the result of buyers with high 
private benefits. In addition, private 
benefits are important also to explain 
deals where the announcement return 
is positive, especially if the block 
price is significantly higher than the 
exchange-traded share price after the 
trade announcement. This is because 
the price response in the stock market 
already incorporates the gains from the 
increase in shared security benefits. 
Therefore, a block price that is even 
higher is likely to reflect private benefits 
(Barclay and Holderness (1989)).
3.3 Illiquidity costs
When both the announcement return 
and the block premium are negative, 
the model infers that those deals were 
caused by liquidity shocks. However, 
positive announcement returns may 
also follow trades caused by liquidity 
shocks. Such would be the case if the 
seller meets a high-value buyer, i.e., 
a future block-holder who provides 
liquidity and increases cash flow. 
Because the buyer pays a fire sale price 
to the block, the block premium is low 
or negative.
The model is able also to infer illiquidity 
costs from trades that were not caused 
by a liquidity shock. In the absence of a 
liquidity shock, the block changes hands 
only if the available potential block-
holder can increase the cash flow. In 
this case, block and share prices differ 
partly because liquidity shocks penalize 
block holders more than dispersed 
shareholders, who are unaffected by 
the lower expected fire sale price in a 
future sale.6 
5  Private benefits derived by ‘tunneling’ the firm’s cash flow have distortionary effects on value that are not 
covered by AS. However, Albuquerque and Schroth (2010) show that, due to the incentive alignment effect 
of large stakes, this form of private benefits extraction is unlikely to have any effects on the value of blocks 
consisting of more than 35 percent of shares.
6  In reality, not all liquidity shocks lead to fire sales because the block holder’s reservation value may exceed the 
block’s fire sale value. The reservation value, which summarizes the value of all the alternatives to a fire sale, 
would include, for example, the use of the block as collateral on a loan or the sale of a non-controlling share 
of the block itself. The AS data include trades where the block holder chooses to sell the entire block over the 
potential alternatives. AS show that these considerations result in estimates of the marketability discount that 
are a lower bound to the true values. Hence, our approach, gives a conservative estimate of these discounts.
The marketability discount of controlling blocks of shares | 5
© 2014 KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”). KPMG International provides no client services and is a Swiss entity with which the independent member firms of the KPMG network are affiliated.
4.   Data
Data for the marketability discount is 
from AS. Data on the determinants 
of the marketability discount come 
from three sources: the Board of 
Governors of the US Federal Reserve 
for characteristics of the aggregate 
economy, and CRSP and Compustat for 
industry and firm-level data. 
4.1 Data on marketability 
discounts
AS estimate the marketability discount 
using data on block trades (114 US 
disclosed-value trades of blocks 
consisting of at least 35 percent but 
not more than 90 percent of the stock 
of a company) from Thomson One 
Banker Acquisitions. From their analysis, 
we construct two measures of the 
marketability discount, MD1 and MD2. 
MD1 and MD2 have both a time stamp 
and a firm identifier. The time stamp on 
MD1 and MD2 is the date of the block 
trade that was used to produce the 
estimates. The firm identifier in MD1 
and MD2 refers to the target firm whose 
shares were traded. 
MD1 is the marketability discount in 
percentage terms that can be applied 
to the value of a firm derived from a 
standard discounted cash flow analysis, 
or any similar valuation method, which 
are known to omit the illiquidity of the 
controlling block. MD1 is the appropriate 
discount in the case of shares of 
privately held corporations where a 
share price is unobservable. MD2 is the 
marketability discount in percentage 
terms that can be applied to the price of 
the shares traded in an active market. 
MD2 is appropriate for the case of public 
corporations. Therefore, the total value 
of the block under MD1 is:
Value of block =  Present value of cash 
flows under block holder 
x (1 – MD1) 
+ Present value of private 
benefits to block holder
and under MD2 is:
Value of block =  Present value of cash 
flows under block holder 
+ Present value of private 
benefits to block holder 
– MD1 x Exchange share 
price
The top panel of Figure 2 contains a 
scatter plot of MD1 and MD2 over 
time. From the figure, we note two 
main patterns. First, note that MD1 
and MD2 are very similar for almost 
all trades. Second, there are periods 
of systematically high values of the 
marketability discount. These periods 
may be captured by economy-wide 
variables that are associated with 
liquidity drying up. In fact, in the bottom 
panel of Figure 2, we plot the yield 
curve slope, measured by the difference 
in the 10-year rate and the 3-month 
Treasury bills rate, over the same time 
period. The periods of high marketability 
discount appear to correlate well with 
the periods where the term structure 
of interest rates had a negative or low 
slope. Below, we show that this is true 
for other economy-wide variables as 
well. Third, there appears to be a role 
for industry and firm-level variables 
as determinants of liquidity, since 
even during these periods there is 
considerable variation in MD1 and MD2.
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Figure 2: Marketability discounts and yield spreads over time
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Figure 3 contains histograms of MD1 
and MD2. On average MD1 is 
13.15 percent and MD2 is 12.50 percent 
and the respective minimum values 
are 0.2 percent and 0.1 percent. It is 
interesting to note that marketability 
discounts are low for a very large 
fraction of the observations. One 
way to interpret our findings is that 
liquidity shocks are rare; in a way 
they are outlier events. However, it is 
worth noting that Figure 3 shows the 
marketability discount estimates only 
for the sampled firm-years. Moreover, 
as we discuss next, the marketability 
discount varies significantly depending 
on the external market conditions 
surrounding the trade. Therefore, the 
discount on any given firm may increase 
to very high levels in periods of low 
market liquidity. Understanding the 
role and significance of these external 
conditions, or determinants of the 
marketability discount, is the main focus 
of this article.
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4.2 Determinants of the 
marketability discount
We classify the determinants of the 
marketability discount into two groups: 
economy-wide determinants and 
industry and firm-level determinants. 
These variables are measured with a lag 
relative to the respective marketability 
discounts. Table 1 describes these 
determinants in detail.
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Figure 3: Distribution of marketability discounts
Table 1: Description of determinants of the marketability discount
Economy-wide variables
Variable Description
Market return Annualized average daily returns on the equally-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks for 
the last month before the deal (%). 
GDP growth Average annual growth rate in US GDP per capita in the last quarter prior to the trade (%). 
Market volatility Standard deviation of the annualized daily returns on the equally-weighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks for the 12 month-period before the deal (%). 
Yield curve slope Difference between the interest rate on the 10 year and the three-month Treasury bill (%). 
Fontaine-Garcia index Fontaine and Garcia's (2011) monthly index of the value of funding liquidity: the higher the index, the lower the 
bond market liquidity.
Industry- and firm-specific variables
Variable Description
Industry's M&A 
activity
Total M&A activity during the last quarter before the deal, where the target is in the same two-digit SIC Code as 
the deal's target ($ billions).
Target minus industry 
leverage
Difference between the proportion of total debt to total assets on the last fiscal year before the trade 
announcement between the target firm and the median of all firms in the same three-digit SIC code.
Target volatility Standard deviation of the target's annualized average daily return for the 12 month-period ending two months 
before the trade announcement (%). 
Industry's asset 
specificity
Median proportion of machinery and equipment to total assets of all firms in the same three-digit SIC code as 
the target firm, as defined by Stromberg (2001).
Industry's market-to-
book ratio
Median ratio of the market value of the firm (book value of debt + market value of equity) to the book value of 
total assets of all firms in the same three-digit SIC code as the target firm.
Block-to-Industry Size Ratio of the total controlling block value to the total market capitalization of all NYSE and AMEX firms in the 
same two-digit SIC Code as the target. 
We include characteristics of the 
aggregate economy that may produce 
shocks to the block holder’s liquidity 
and thus changes in the marketability 
discount. We expect these shocks to 
occur in times of tighter aggregate 
funding liquidity. Our proxy for funding 
liquidity is the bond liquidity premium 
index in Fontaine and Garcia (2012) 
(Fontaine-Garcia index). Fontaine and 
Garcia (2012) identify a monthly liquidity 
factor from the yield spread between 
US Treasury bills with the same cash 
flows but different ages. They interpret 
the higher yields on otherwise identical 
older Treasury bills as a premium on 
the liquidity of on-the-run bonds. We 
hypothesize that Fontaine-Garcia 
index is positively associated with the 
marketability discount.7
7  We also considered as candidate proxies for funding liquidity the TED spread, i.e., the spread between the 
3-month dollar LIBOR rate and the 3-month Treasury bill, and the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) stock market 
liquidity factor. These variables produce similar results. 
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We include also the growth of US 
GDP per capita (GDP growth) and the 
average daily return on the equally-
weighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ stocks (Market Return). 
The inclusion of these business cycle 
proxies is meant to capture two 
opposing effects: during expansions,  
(i) investors have stronger balance 
sheets and are less likely to face liquidity 
shocks, and, (ii) better alternative 
investment opportunities may generate 
a demand for cash.8 We try to separate 
these opposing effects by combining 
the business cycle variables with 
variables related to aggregate funding 
costs. We argue that having a better 
alternative investment opportunity 
would only force a block holder to sell if 
at the same time the cost of borrowing 
is high. The proxy for the cost of funding 
used is the slope of the yield curve 
(Yield curve slope). We expect high 
GDP growth and high Market return 
to have a negative direct effect on the 
marketability discount, but a positive 
effect via their interaction with the Yield 
curve slope.
We also include in the determinants of 
the marketability discount the standard 
deviation of the market return (Market 
Volatility). Gromb and Vayanos (2002) 
and Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009) show that liquidity providers 
face tighter funding constraints when 
market returns are low and volatility 
is high and thereby diminish their role 
as liquidity providers (see also Chordia 
et al., 2002). We therefore predict the 
marketability discount to decrease with 
Market Return and to increase with 
Market Volatility. 
We consider several firm and industry 
determinants of the marketability 
discount. Williamson (1988) argues 
that asset liquidation values should 
be closely related to the asset’s 
redeployability. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992) add that, because distressed 
assets tend to be put to the best use 
by liquidating them within the same 
industry, redeployability is a function of 
the industry’s capacity to absorb them. 
We adopt these ideas about the liquidity 
of physical assets to the financial asset 
under consideration. As a proxy for the 
‘financial redeployability’ of the block, 
we use the ratio of the block value to 
the total market capitalization of all 
firms in the same two-digit SIC group 
(Block-to-Industry Size) (see Gavazza, 
2010). Based on this interpretation, 
we expect the marketability discount 
to increase with the relative size of 
the block. However, if block holders 
have a preference for relatively larger 
blocks to exert fuller control, then the 
marketability discount should vary 
negatively with Block-to-Industry Size.
Another proxy for the redeployability of 
the block is obtained from the industry’s 
asset specificity. We follow Stromberg 
(2001) and measure Industry’s asset 
specificity with the median proportion 
of machinery and equipment to total 
assets of all firms in the industry 
(non-industry specific assets include 
land, commercial real estate and 
cash). As with Block-to-Industry Size, 
Industry’s asset specificity measures 
the redeployability of the physical assets 
rather than of the controlling block. We 
view Industry’s asset specificity as a 
proxy for the amount of industry-specific 
knowledge required by the controlling 
block holder and expect more potential 
buyers of controlling stakes in firms 
that use generic productive assets. 
Hence, we predict a positive association 
between Industry’s asset specificity and 
the marketability discount.
We include the total dollar volume of 
M&A activity involving targets in the 
same two-digit SIC group (Industry’s 
M&A activity). High Industry’s M&A 
Activity could be the result of an 
increased supply of industry-specific 
assets, which would increase the 
marketability discount. High Industry’s 
M&A Activity could also reflect high 
liquidity for industry-specific assets as in 
Schlingemann et al. (2002) and Ortiz-
Molina and Phillips (2011) and, therefore, 
decrease the marketability discount. 
We let the marketability discount vary 
with the target’s leverage relative to 
its industry’s median leverage. We 
define Target minus Industry Leverage 
as the difference between the target’s 
proportion of long-term debt to assets 
and the median proportion of long-
term debt to assets of all firms in the 
same three-digit SIC code. We expect 
that block holders’ price in a larger 
marketability discount for firms with 
more long-term debt as they are more 
constrained to borrow to fund any 
restructuring activities. To control for 
the time-series variation in investment 
opportunities in the same industry, we 
include the median ratio of the market-
to-book value of assets of all firms in the 
same three-digit SIC code. Finally, we 
control for the possibility that fire sale 
prices are affected by the target firm’s 
return volatility.
Ultimately, other data on the 
motivations for a trade may be relevant 
in individual cases. But a lack of such 
data on a systematic basis on other 
deals prevents us from pursuing a 
proper statistical analysis of their 
relevance.
8  Bates (2005) and Hovakimian and Titman (2006) show that firms that sell assets keep more of the money from 
the asset sale if they have more growth opportunities.
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5. 
5.1 Estimating elasticities
We regress the marketability discount 
on its determinants. We estimate two 
different econometric specifications, 
one that uses the logarithm, and 
another that uses the level, of each of 
the discount measures, MD1 and MD2. 
For statistical reasons, the logarithm 
specification is preferred since the 
marketability discount is truncated at 
zero and highly skewed. 
For MD1, and for the logarithm 
specification, we obtain:
Cross-sectional and time-series 
variation in the marketability discount
ln MD1=  1.98    0.08  0.51  – + x Yield curve slope + x Fontaine-Garcia index
(0.62) (0.12) (0.19)
 7.39    7.16    17.93  – x Market return –  x Market volatility – x GDP growth
(1.48) (2.21) (8.06)
 6.27   + x Yield curve slope x GDP growth 
(3.68)
 0.69   + x Yield curve slope x Market return 
(0.60)
 1.05   + x Target minus industry leverage 
(0.31)
 0.94 + x Industry’s asset specificity 
(0.47)
0.33   0.73   – x Industry’s market-to-book ratio – x Block-to-Industry size
(0.23) (2.70)
 0.12    0.46 – x Industry’s M&A activity – x Target volatility; R 2= 0.74
(0.03) (0.21)
For MD2, and again for the logarithm specification, we obtain very similar 
estimates, both qualitatively and quantitatively:
ln MD2=  1.95    0.16  0.62  – + x Yield curve slope + x Fontaine-Garcia index
(0.72) (0.14) (0.23)
 6.89    8.59    19.95  
– x Market return –  x Market volatility – x GDP growth
(1.73) (2.58) (9.42)
 8.10   
+ x Yield curve slope x GDP growth 
(4.30)
 0.28   
+ x Yield curve slope x Market return 
(0.70)
 1.21   
+ x Target minus industry leverage 
(0.36)
 1.20 + x Industry’s asset specificity 
(0.55)
0.60   1.25   – x Industry’s market-to-book ratio – x Block-to-Industry size
(0.27) (3.16)
 0.18    0.63 
– x Industry’s M&A activity – x Target volatility; R 2= 0.76
(0.03) (0.25)
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Associated with each variable, there 
is the estimated coefficient and 
underneath it, in parenthesis, the 
standard deviation of the estimate. The 
high R2 in both regressions indicate 
that the specifications explain well the 
marketability discount. The R2 in the 
regressions that use the level of the 
discounts as the left hand side variable 
are in the range of 60 percent. 
In Table 2, we convert the estimated 
coefficients from these regressions 
into elasticities that give the percentage 
change in the marketability discount 
induced by one percentage change 
in each of the liquidity determinants, 
keeping all others constant. By 
and large, the two specifications 
produce very similar results, with the 
logarithmic specification occasionally 
yielding slightly more statistically 
significant estimates. 
To rank each determinant of liquidity by 
its explanatory power, we compute the 
partial correlation coefficient between 
the marketability discount and said 
determinant. The partial correlation, 
say between MD1 and GDP growth, is 
calculated as the correlation between 
the residual of regressing MD1 on all its 
determinants except for GDP growth 
and the residual of regressing GDP 
growth on all the liquidity determinants 
except itself. Table 3 presents the 
correlation coefficients between 
MD1 and its determinants, as well as 
their squared values, which give the 
proportion of the residual variation in the 
marketability discount that is explained 
by each determinant. The determinants 
are ordered by their relevance. The 
results for MD2 are almost identical and 
therefore omitted from the table.
Table 3 presents evidence consistent 
with the marketability discount being 
most highly correlated with economy-
wide or business cycle determinants of 
liquidity, Market Return and GDP growth. 
Periods of high Market Return or GDP 
growth are periods of increased liquidity 
and lower marketability discounts, as 
predicted. Quantitatively, we find that 
in an economic expansion, equivalent 
to a one standard deviation increase in 
GDP growth relative to its mean, the 
average MD1 is 1.5 percent, whereas in 
an economic recession, equivalent to a 
one standard deviation decrease in GDP 
growth relative to its mean, the average 
MD1 is 24.8 percent. The numbers for 
the average MD2 are 0.6 percent and 
24.4 percent, respectively.9
Table 2: The elasticities of the marketability discount with respect to its determinants
Econometric Log on levels Levels on levels
Specification Marketability discount 1 Marketability discount 2 Marketability discount 1 Marketability discount 2
Economy-wide variables
Market return -0.792*** -0.817*** -0.563*** -0.578***
(0.101) (0.118) (0.136) (0.144)
GDP growth -0.921*** -0.989*** -0.811*** -0.842***
(0.115) (0.135) (0.156) (0.165)
Market volatility -1.004*** -1.205*** -0.692 -0.425
(0.309) (0.362) (0.418) (0.262)
Yield curve slope 0.621*** 0.768*** 0.799*** 0.847***
(0.161) (0.188) (0.217) (0.229)
Fontaine-Garcia index 0.412*** 0.499*** 0.665***  0.422***
(0.156) (0.182) (0.211) (0.132)
Industry- and firm-specific variables
Industry's M&A activity -0.477*** -0.702*** -0.445*** -0.478***
(0.106) (0.124) (0.143) (0.152)
Target minus industry 
leverage
0.047***
(0.014)
0.054***
(0.016)
0.039**
(0.019)
0.040**
(0.020)
Target volatility -0.182** -0.253** -0.282** -0.303**
(0.084) (0.098) (0.114) (0.120)
Industry asset specificity 0.254** 0.327** 0.273*** 0.291***
(0.126) (0.148) (0.087) (0.097)
Industry market-to-book 
ratio
-0.413
(0.290)
-0.738**
(0.339)
-0.45
(0.392)
-0.494
(0.414)
Block-to-Industry Size -0.006 -0.01 0.025 0.027
(0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.031)
This table reports the elasticities of the marketability and control discounts of majority controlling blocks with respect to their 
determinants. Their standard errors are shown underneath, in brackets. Estimates followed by ***, **, and * are statistically significant to 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. The variables are defined in Table 1. The elasticities are derived from the regression of the logarithms 
or the levels of the marketability discounts predicted by the search model in Albuquerque and Schroth (2013) on the determinants shown 
above, using a sample of 114 acquisitions of controlling blocks between 35 percent and 90 percent of the common stock, which occurred 
between January of 1990 and December of 2010.
9  It’s possible too that fewer deals are made during recessions. For example, during the European sovereign 
debt crisis the affected governments sold assets in search of liquidity but sometimes backed out of intended 
sales possibly because the marketability discount associated would be too large. Such is the case of the main 
public airline company in Portugal, TAP.
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Of the remaining economy-wide 
determinants of liquidity, the proxies for 
funding costs and funding liquidity, Yield 
curve slope and Fontaine-Garcia index, 
respectively, also appear quantitatively 
important, but their effect, as measured 
by the squared partial correlation, is 
less than one-fourth of the effect of the 
business cycle variables.
Of the industry and firm-level 
determinants of liquidity, the most 
significant one is Industry’s M&A 
Activity. Periods with high Industry’s 
M&A Activity appear to be associated 
with increased demand for industry 
assets and low marketability discounts. 
The effect of Target minus Industry 
Leverage is positive as expected, 
though smaller with a squared partial 
correlation of 10.4 percent. All other 
industry and firm-level determinants 
have squared partial correlations that are 
at or below five percent. Surprisingly, 
our results suggest that the variables 
that proxy for the block’s redeployability, 
Industry’s asset specificity and Block-to-
Industry Size, are marginally significant 
at best. This is not conclusive evidence 
that asset specificity is not relevant to 
determine liquidity in block trades partly 
because of the difficulty of finding good 
proxies for financial redeployability. 
5.2 Predicting the 
marketability discount 
for privately held 
corporations: An 
application to the case  
of Mandelbaum et al  
v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue
Next, we use the elasticities in Table 2 
to compute the change in the 
marketability discount given changes in 
its determinants. To illustrate, we use 
the actual values in Mandelbaum et al. v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1995). 
In the Court’s decision regarding 
Mandelbaum et al. v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue, the Judge applied 
a 30 percent discount with respect to 
the standard valuation, ruling against 
the plaintiff’s expert claim to apply a 
75 percent discount on the ‘virtually 
illiquid’ block of shares of Big M, Inc., a 
chain of department stores specialized 
in sporting goods located in northern 
New Jersey. The Judge argued that 
he had no other choice but to apply 
the average observed discount on 
stocks with trading restrictions, but 
suggested that this discount was not 
ideal because the illiquidity of blocks is 
not the same as trading restrictions on 
small amounts of shares, and because 
discounts should vary with deal and 
macroeconomic effects. 
Table 3: Explanatory power of the marketability discounts determinants
Determinants
Partial 
correlation 
coefficient
Squared 
Significance 
partial 
(p-value)
correlation
Discounts interval following a partial one sample 
standard devitation decrease/increase in each 
determinant
Marketability discount 1 Marketability discount 2
Economy-wide variables
Market return -0.652 0.425 0.000 [ 0.002, 0.260 ] [ 0.000, 0.252 ]
GDP growth -0.639 0.409 0.000 [ 0.015, 0.248 ] [ 0.006, 0.244 ]
Market volatility -0.381 0.145 0.000 [ 0.082, 0.181 ] [ 0.082, 0.181 ]
Yield curve slope 0.304 0.092 0.002 [ 0.075, 0.188 ] [ 0.059, 0.191 ]
Fontaine-Garcia index 0.215 0.046 0.028 [ 0.098, 0.165 ] [ 0.086, 0.164 ]
Industry- and firm-specific variables
Industry's M&A activity -0.456 0.208 0.000 [ 0.072, 0.191 ] [ 0.042, 0.208 ]
Target minus industry 
leverage
0.322 0.104 0.001 [ 0.093, 0.170 ] [ 0.083, 0.167 ]
Target volatility -0.211 0.045 0.031 [ 0.107, 0.156 ] [ 0.093, 0.157 ]
Industry asset specificity 0.204 0.041 0.038 [ 0.108, 0.155 ] [ 0.097, 0.154 ]
Industry market-to-book 
ratio
-0.073 0.005 0.462 [ 0.111, 0.152 ] [ 0.090, 0.160 ]
Block-to-Industry Size -0.045 0.002 0.653 [ 0.128, 0.135 ] [ 0.120, 0.130 ]
This table reports the correlation coefficient of the marketability discount of majority controlling blocks with each of its determinants after 
removing the effects of all other determinants. The variables are ranked according to the square of this partial correlation. The significance 
level (p-value) is for the test that each determinant's partial correlation with the marketability discount is zero. The table also reports the 
predicted marketability discounts on the controlling block following a decrease or an increase by one sample standard deviation in each 
determinant, keeping the others constant.
Table 4 shows how to use the 
information above to get an estimate 
for the marketability discount to apply 
in the case of Big M, Inc. stock. To 
conduct this exercise, we focus on the 
top three economy-wide determinants 
and the top three industry- and firm-
level determinants of MD1. The top 
part of Table 4 documents the mean 
and standard deviation of these 
determinants in the AS sample, under 
the heading “Sample statistics,” and the 
actual data from Big M, Inc., its industry 
(three-digit SIC Code 531, Department 
Stores) and the US economy on 
December of 1990, under the heading 
“Big M, Inc.” The last column in the top 
part of Table 4, shows the percentage 
difference between the values for Big M, 
Inc. and the sample means in AS. 
The resulting marketability discount is 
shown at the bottom part of Table 4. 
It is calculated by adding to the 
mean discount (bottom-left) the 
sum of the changes induced by each 
variable. These are estimated by 
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Table 4: Estimating the block discount for Big M, Inc. in December 1990
Sample statistics Big M, Inc.
Data
Mean Standard deviation Values % difference
Economy-wide variables
Market return 12.74% 15.78% -1.98% -115.52%
GDP growth 3.23% 3.11% 0.56% -82.80%
Market volatility 14.03% 5.25% 15.96% 13.73%
Industry- and firm-specific variables
Industry's M&A activity 3.879 3.682 0.569 -85.34%
Target minus industry 0.045 0.280 -0.139 -409.41%
leverage
Target volatility 39.83% 40.13% 24.47% -38.56%
Sample Predicted
Discounts
Mean Standard deviation Mean Standard error
Marketability discount 1 13.15% 22.19% 37.13% 21.22%
Marketability discount 2 12.50% 22.27% 38.42% 20.11%
This table illustrates the estimation of the marketability and control discounts for the controlling block of Big M, Inc., a chain of sports 
goods retail shops located in New Jersey, using the elasticities reported in Table 2, and the determinants of discounts with an effect 
significant to the 0.01 level (see Table 3). 
multiplying the percentage change 
(column 4, Table 4) times their elasticity 
(columns 1 and 2, Table 2). Interestingly, 
the Judge’s estimate of 30 percent 
is remarkably close to the average of 
the relevant discount (MD1) in the 
AS sample, i.e., 37.13 percent. In our 
results, this high discount is explained 
by the facts that the US economy was 
growing at a pace below mean and 
the stock market had experienced low 
returns, coupled with low M&A activity 
in the industry. The ameliorating factor 
was that Big M, Inc. was significantly 
less levered than its industry peers as 
compared with the average target in the 
AS sample. 
This exercise underscores the need 
to condition the measurement of the 
marketability discount on firm, industry 
and economy-wide characteristics. One 
of the main results from our exercise is 
that the marketability discount varies 
dramatically across firms, industries 
and time. Therefore, the application 
of unconditional averages can lead to 
biased results. While the Judge for 
Mandelbaum et al. v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue (1995) raised 
this concern, at the time there was 
no way to address it. Of course, the 
quantitative analysis that we propose 
is not to be seen as a rule of thumb to 
be applicable blindly. Instead, judgment 
is required to consider for example, 
any special circumstances, facts and 
variables ignored in the analysis, and 
the bargaining power of the buyer 
and seller in each transaction.10 In 
addition, one reason for exercising 
judgement that transpires from our 
exercise is the high standard error of the 
estimated marketability discount. In the 
Mandelbaum case, the estimated mean 
value of MD1 has a standard error of 
21 percent.
10  Knowing for example the prospects for a future IPO or the capacity of the firm to pay dividends may further 
contribute to improve these estimates.
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6.   Summary and conclusions
The precise valuation of controlling 
blocks of shares must recognize the 
complex effects of the illiquidity of the 
market for corporate control. Evidence 
suggests that shares in these privately 
negotiated blocks trade at prices that 
differ substantially from the share price 
that the same companies trade at in 
active markets. While it is possible 
and necessary to solve and estimate a 
model that spells out this complexity, 
it is also necessary to devise a 
way to use the model’s results in a 
straightforward way.
We have analyzed the marketability 
discount and a laundry list of possible 
determinants of liquidity. We provided 
both a ranking of these determinants 
based on economic and statistical 
significance and a way of combining 
this information to estimate the 
marketability discount on blocks 
of shares. 
Besides its simplicity, two important 
strengths of our results are that 
(i) they allow for firm, industry and 
macroeconomic determinants of 
liquidity to affect the marketability 
discount, and (ii) it can be quite accurate 
relative to the more exact approach in 
AS with remarkably little data. Economy-
wide variables appear to capture well 
periods of drying up liquidity.
The simplicity of our approach should 
not hide the complexity of the issue. 
The quantitative estimates that can 
be derived using the elasticities we 
offer have to be judged based on the 
statistical significance of the estimates, 
as well as based on information 
that has not been quantified in the 
analysis. For example, in any valuation 
analysis consideration may be given to 
behavioral factors such as the bargaining 
power of the buyer and seller, or non-
behavioral factors that we omitted in 
the analysis. Also, consideration may be 
given to alternative ways of disposing 
the asset including the piecemeal sale 
of the block. 
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